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THE REQUISITIONED AND THE GOVERNMENTOWNED SHIP
JURISDICTION IN TH~ COURTS OF GMAT BRITAIN, FRANC~,
AND TH~ UNIT~D STAT~

URISDICTION over requisitioned and government-owned merchantmen and thejr liabilities under maritime laws are
questions which present no real novelty. They were regarded by
the ancient sea-law and were as familiar to it as they have recently
become, 'On account of the exigencies of the late war, to the admiralty systems of to-day. The maritime law of Rome supplies modern cases with the most cogent parallels and is reflected today in
the jurisprudence of France and other continental and Latin countries. The jurisdictional question which figures most prominently
in these cases relates to the authority to arrest or libel the property
of a foreign sovereign. It is stili in the controversial state in the
United States. In France, administrative law has dealt with the
question in a manner both practical and consistent with the best
principles of jurispntdence. In British law, public use, as distinguished from the possession of the government, affords immunity
from arrest to the requisitioned or publicly owned merchant vessel
of a foreign sovereign.
The subject of the government-owned and requisitioned ship, in
fact, far antedates Roman Imperial law. In the oration of Demosthenes against Dionysodorus, in the Athenian courts, we have an
action on a bottomry loan made to the masters of a vessel as agents
of the Governor of Egypt, both cargo and ship doubtless belonging
to the Egyptian State. Vessels encargoed for the account of the
Roman Government are frequently referred to in Justinian. Their
status is closely analagous to that of the requisitioned ship. Numerous laws appear regulative of their voyages,1 extending immunities
to their owners, masters, and mariners,2 fixing their responsibility
with respect to transportation, imposts and deliveries, 3 penalizing
illegal traffic in commodities transported for the state, and forbid-

J

1

The Code, Lib. XI, tit. 1, frag. 8; Lib. XI, tit. 5, frag. 3.
XI, tit. I.
3 Lib. XI, tit. I, frag. 4, 5, 6, 7.
2 Lib.
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ding deviations. Apparently the entire merchant marine of Rome
was subject to government requisition whenever and wherever public need demanded it. The law imposed heavy penalties, including
often confiscation of the ship, for evasions of this duty of the ship
owner toward the state. Displacement fixed the class of vessels
liable to requisition and no excuse, proprietary privilege, or even
imperial sanction availed to exempt the ship owner. All the ships
on the Tiber were equally liable to government use. So exclusive
was the right of the state, that those who placed their merchandise
aboard vessels already encargoed for the government, not only
incurred severe punishment, but became liable for the perils of
the sea.
. The real value of this historical aspect of the question, as it is
presented to British and American courts of Admiralty, is apparent
when it is observed that linder the administrative law of Imperial
Rome the greater part of state properties was submitted to both
the rules and procedure of the civil law. Fiscal properties were
distinguished from communal, and both of these from the private
domain of the Emperor, in whom the title to public property extra-commercittm appears to have vested ;4 but even the private domain
of the Emperor was subject to all legal measures known to the
civil law of Rome incident to the acquisition, alienation of, and
acquiring· of security in property. Excluded from that part, ex.tracommerciitm of the patrimonio romani popiili or patrimonial property of the Roman state, the properties controlled by the Imperial
"Fisc" such as mines, forests, etc., while administered largely by
Imperial rescripts, were subject to all the obligations imposed by
the municipal law of Rome. It was not different in the realm of
maritime affairs. The property, movable and immovable, of shipowners, masters, and mariners in Roman law was subjected by virtue of Imperial rescripts to the obligation of liens to secure the
performance of contracts of affreightment with private parties, and
these measures probably extended to bottomry hypothecations. It
is significant that these liens given by Imperial law were in rem
and attached to all property of mariners, though in the hands of
innocent purchasers, and survived until perfect satisfaction of the
obligation first incurred, ~ven though it happens, says the law, ''tbat
4

Lib. XI, tit. 70.
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such property comes into our (the Imperial) patrimony."u It is
therefore clear that in Roman law the personal contractual obligations of ship-~wners, etc., gave rise to rights in rem which were
not extinguished by the property so invested with a lien coming
into the ownership of the Emperor or state. "The charge is in the
thing and not on the person," says the rescript, the lien only being
divested if the property ceases to be alienable and is subordinated
to some purpose, e.~tra-comniercium. No evasion of the pecuniary
responsibility of mariners for the safe transport of government ~ar
goes is countenanced by Roman law, which rule affords further
evidence that vessels requisitioned by the Roman state did not by
reason of that alone enjoy any exemption from liability in rem.
In view of the fact that Roman law gave a lien in favor of the
shipper enforceable against the ship or other property of its owner,
though the same had come not only into the possession but into
the ownership of the Roman state or its Imperial representative, ·
and of the further fact that this right arose out of contractual obligation and affected property_!n coninierciuni with respect to which
even Imperial Rome could set up no defense of immunity from
suit, the continental system as exemplified in the modern practice
of France is thoroughly understandable. In general, the- requisition
of a merchant vessel, say French authorities, does not alter ownership, but temporarily suppresses its enjoyment.0 The indeterminate
character of the state's obligation to the ship-owner and the reciprocal rights, duties, and liabilities of the latter with regard not only
to the state but third parties have ultimated in the adoption-of uniform types of charter-parties and contracts of carriage and of hire.
The general requisition in 1918 of the French merchant marine
was characterized by the assumption by the state of the liabilities
of an insurer, both with respect to marine and war risks, and the
submission of all controversies arising under the charter-party to
the jurisdiction of the administrative courts. Contracts relative to
the commercial exploitation under private management of French
vessels, or those formerly of enemy ownership, or, again, of neutral or allied ships under requisition to and laden for the account
of the French government, uniformly refer jurisdiction to the cogu Lib.
6

XI, tit. 2.
Collin, Situation de l'annament maritime en France, 1914-19.
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nizance of the administrative courts and make no exception, because
of sovereignty, with respect to the justiciable character of suits
-respecting shipping so affected to public use or belonging to the
state. The jurisdiction of the administrative courts in France, as
compared with courts having1 regard to the civil relations of citizens
inter se, is characterized by essential differences in the legal principles applied governing the relations of the individual and the state.
The relation of the administrative courts to the judicial is comparable to that which equity bears to the common law in Anglo-i\merican law. There is no analogy between the French administrative
system and the constitutional relations between American governmental authorities and citizens, nor to the functions and powers of
the Crown and its servants in England which must be exercised in
accordance with those ordinary common law principles governing
the relations of one subject to another. In France the rights of
parties under public law depend upon administrative acts whose
interpretation results necessarily to the administrative courts. Acts
of executive power constituting so-called actes de gouvernement
may be limited to a very restricted class outside of which no administrative act could properly be regarded as an act of the state drawing to it immunities in favor of sovereignty; or, in the opinion of
other writers, any executive act united with a political aim (inspire
par 1tn mobile politiqiee) may be treated as an act of state which
lies outside the jurisdiction of any court whatever. 7 With these
general considerations in mind, it is apparent that the intervention of the state in maritime affairs creates a very important
branch of French maritime law as well as a most varied control of
shipping, private and public. It exhibits some incongruity in the
survival of very ancient rules. As a distinct branch of French maritime law it remains unqualified, except for some general compilations of the older regulations and modern ordinances, rules, and
statutory enactments. French maritime law itself, while theoretically comprehending the totality of juridicial relations between private persons engaged in maritime transport, is divisible between
the civil and commercial jurisdictions, the greater part, relative to
7 Compare Laferriere, Traite de la Juridiction Administrative, II, Lib.
IV, ch. 2, p. 32, and Hauriou, Precis· de Droit Administrative, pp. 282-7, with
Jacquelin, La Juridictio11: Administrative, pp. 438-17.
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the ownership of vessels and their transmission being purely civil
law; nor is the maritime law of France a mere accessory of the
commercial law. That part destined to be regulative of the relations of purely private law bears the unmistakable imprint of the
administrative regulations and rules of public law.
These salient distinctions are seen in French law and judicial
opinion relative to merchant vessels owned or requisitioned by the
state. It is apparent from an examination of the extensive legislation in France controlling the French merchant marine and its
requisition by the state during the late war, together with decisions
relative thereto, that French jurisprudence has not regarded the
participation of the state in maritime affairs as conferring any
immunity in respect of civil obligations, but in full appreciation of
the justiciable character of the controversies which have arisen has
submitted them to the ordinary municipal law of France, though
cognizance has been restricted to the administrative tribunals.
While the state in the event of a collision between a private ship and
a war vessel must bring its claim in the judicial courts, the victim
of the collision must cite the state before the Conseil d'Etat, appeal
lying from a decision of the Ministry of Marine refusing indemnity.8
The administrative tribunals are equally competent when the ship
is affected to public uses of the state. 9
As a general principle of French law, the French courts are
incompetent to take jurisdiction of controversies between foreigners
not domiciled in France respecting either personal rights or movable
property. In a recent decision10 the ship Kolaos, which it was
alleged by the government of Greece had been fraudulently sold to
an Italian, armed, and placed in the government service of Italy,
and which it was the purpose of the Greek government to requisi8 Trib.

des Conflits, Jan. 17, 1874, D. 74, 3, 4; Com: d'Etat, May II, 1870,
D. 71, 3, 57; Feb. 15, 1872, D. 73, 3, 57; April 15, 1873, D. 73, 3, 58; July 22,
1899, Clunet, 1894. p. 813; March 19, 1897, Revue internationale de droit
maritime, XXII, 663; March 16, 1900, ibid., XVIII, 142, D., 1901, 3, 57, S.,
1!)02, 3, 64.
o Trib. des Conflits, July 6, 1912, R I. D. M., XXVIII, 530. See also
Ripert, Droit maritime, XI, 529, par. 1926.
io The Government of Greece v. The Government of Italy; Ambatielos
and Societe Nationale de Navigations de Genoa, Cour d'Appel de Bordeaux,
Dec. 4, 1917.
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tion, was arrested in the Port of Bordeaux. The French court
refused to take jurisdiction of this litigation between the Italian
and Greek governments since to do so would have involved them in
the regulation of international relations. Incompetency was asserted
ratione niateria, since adjudication would have necessitated the construction of both foreign law and diplomatic conventions and consequently the international public law of the contending governments, each of whicl). relied upon its sovereign rights which the
French court affirmed were above ordinary judicial process. It is,
however, notable that the decision condemned the Greek government to the payment of an amend and all the expenses of the appeal
and previous trials. Both governments were en presence and there
appears to have been no refusal to appear emanating from diplomatic sources nor plea to the jurisdiction. It is further noteworthy
that whereas the conservatory measures demanded by the Greek
government to secure the requisitioning of the vessel were refused,
nevertheless the vessel throughout this prolonged litigation was
detained in port as a result of saisie conservatoire authorized by
the administrative tribunal. It was the substantial holding of the
court that further sequestration of the vessel would be in exercise
of an unauthorized jurisdiction. Two facts regarding the French
law of saisie conservatoire are of importance in this connection: the
arrest of a vessel under French law does not confer jurisdiction
upon the commercial court,11 nor does the jurisdiction of such court
arise from the maritime lien which would justify in Anglo-American
practice a libel in reni. What in effect occurred in this important
decision was a refusal on the part of the judicial authorities to concede an executory title in favor of the Greek government. A defect
of jurisdiction being involved, the validity of the arrest was contested, a question with respect to which the tribunals of commerce
are not competent to adjudicate but which must come before the
appropriate civil tribunal. The Cour de Cassation has so held many
times.12 The case did not involve a vessel requisitioned or owned
by the government of France and consequently its adjudication was
Cour d'Appel de Rouen, May IS, r9r8, R. D. I. M., XXXI.
Cass., Aug. 22, r882, D. 83, I', 214; Cass., Nov. II, 1885, D. 86, l, 68;
Tunis, Feb. 2r, r88g, R. I. D. M., V, r30; Oct. 5, r8g3, ibid., IX, 84; Havre,
Oct. r6, r894, ibid., X, 439.
11

12
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not a matter of exclusive jurisdiction in the administrative courts.
The Tribunal Civile de Bordeaux has held very recently13 that a
vessel belonging to the American government, though under charter
to private parties, enjoyed an immunity from _attachment ( saisie
arret) which extended to its papers. These it appears had been
attached by order of customs and port authorities. The principle
asserted by the court of the immunity of vessels belonging to foreign governments as being of universal recognition cannot be
admitted. Continental jurisprudence is divided on the general question of the saisissabilite of the property of a foreign sovereign or
state. France, Belgium, and Germany, like .England, take a position
contrary to that of Italy. For the immunity claimed, we find Foelix,
Rolin-Jacquemyns, Bomans, Bynkershoek, Westlake, Field, Droop,
Cuvelier, Laurent, Holtzendorff, Carre-Chaveau, Dalloz, FrazierHerman, Lawrence, Aubrey, Rau, Pradier-Fodere, Chavegrin, Vattel, Chretien, Fiore, Heffter, Demolombe. In favor of the competency are Von Bar, Calvo, Kliiber, De Paepe, Demangeat, Von Martens, Bonfils, Legat, Despagnet, Piedelievre, Spee, Gabba, Phillimore, Bluntschli, Weiss, Gianzana, Von Heyking, and Giliespie.
It is -probable that Lawrence and Fiore would admit the exception
to the general rule of immunity where the property is destined to
use in commercium, very clearly-recognized by Gabba and Von Bar.
While the Bordeaux decision turned upon the destination of the
attached property to public use or service and is founded upon a
number of preceding decisions, it is very significant that the court,
referring to the learned dissertation of Professor Gabba of the
University of Pisa, 14 comments favorably upon his distinction
between acts of commerce and of government exercised by the state,
admitting the arrest of vessels belonging to foreign governments
where such are engaged in ordinary commerce. "It seems in effect
equitable to assimilate the state acting as an individual to the individual himself."
A distinction however may be observed between saisie conservatoire and saisie arret. The latter is civil in character and predicated
upon an execution-title in him who seeks to effect the arrest. The
general rule is that vessels which are not the subject of private prop13

14

April 27, 1920.
Clunet, 18go, p. 41.
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erty or those which are affected to a public use cannot be seized in
execution of judgments.15 It is not to be inferred, however, that
provisional arrest, the saisie conservatoire, is not effective or sanctioned by French l_aw and practice against requisitioned and government-owned vessels. In fact, it is specifically allowed for French
vessels under the law of April ro, r9o6, Arts. r, 7. In France the
law does not provide for seizure and execution against foreignowned vessels, but notification is made to the consul of the nation
to which the vessel belongs under the authority of the consular
convention. Saisie conservatoire, in ordinary cases, is available to
creditors of the shipowners independently of their civil right in
personam. It is consequential to their droit de suite which is a
right, perhaps not co-extensive with the Anglo-American maritime
lien, but independent of possession and good against all the world.
In effect it may be concluded that the virtual libel of governmentowned and requisitioned vessels whether French or foreign is not
outside the power of French commercial courts or other maritime
authorities, judicial or administrative. If, as held in The Kongsli,1 6
saisie conservatoire is not to be assimilated to an action in rem but
to a personal action, and if British and American decisions, however
rightly, attribute the character of suits in personam to civil actions
in France terminating in the saisie-execution of the ship and its
sale,17 the distinction becomes vital between seizure for purposes of
execution sale in French law, comparable to sale by sheriff under a
fieri facias at common law, and the provisional arrest and detention
of a vessel under the French saisie conservatoire. The latter is
essentially the vindication of a property right in the vessel. Its recognition as such by American courts is an essential and necessary
step in the determination of the question whether the property in
commercium of a state may be subjected to process in admiralty.
In Continental law it must also be borne in mind that this is an
administrative rather than a judicial act. In Italy, at least, the
complementary action of the executive power is no less assured
15 Ripert, Vol. I, par. 892; Mittelstein, De la saisissabilite ou de l'insaisissabilite des navires, R. I. D. M., IX, 91, 648; X, 364; Guilibert, De l'insaisissabilite des navires affectes a un service postal, Clunet, 1885, pp. 515, Aix,
Aug. 3, 1885, Clunet, 1885, p. 55416 252 Fed. 367.
17 Castrique v. Imbrie, L. R. 4 H. L. 414 (1870).
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than if the judge were invested with both jurisdictio and imperimn,
the administrative authorities not being able to dispense with the
duty to conform to civil judgments against the state.18
The courts of Italy have gone far in deciding "that when a government binds itself by contract of a private _character, it can be
summoned by the creditor in any foreign court where such an one
resides." 19 This decision proceeded on the theory that an action
against a foreign state might be entertained, ratione niateria, if the
foundation of the action were such as pertains to the ordinary
administration of the state in which the foreign government has not
acted jure imperii but jure gestionis. Foreign states or sovereigns
conducting economic or commercial activities in Italy are amenable
to the municipal law thereof and subject, not only to the jurisdiction of its courts, but to the execution of judgments. As a general
rule, in so far as the property of the continental nation is alienable
in character and destined to commercial use, it is subject to the rule
of municipal law as other private property. The performance of
cotn!lJercial acts by the state does not confer upon a government
the character of a merchant, but leads, however, to the usual consequences resultant upon commercial transactions. French jurisprudence very uniformly refers adjudication in respect of acts of commerce effected by the state or its officers, or liability incurred by its
vessels under French maritime law, to the administrative tribunals
upon principles of common law as well as the special rules of administrative law. 20
British law is averse to the arrest of King'~ ships, or vessels
belonging to civil departments of the British governme~t, as well
as those in government service belonging to private owners, and
extends like immunity to vessels which are the public property of
foreign states, though engaged in trade, since they are destined to
public use. However, British law permits suits in personam against
18
19

See Gabba, Clunet, 1888, p. 180; 1889, p. 538; 1890, p. 27.
Cour de Gand, March 14, 1879, J. VIII, p. 82, March 22, 1887, J. XV,

p. 289.
20 See the Navire Dalemoor, Cour de Commerce de Marseille, Aug. IO,
1915, R. I. D. M., XXX, 372; Navires Jean Bart, Phoceen, Girelle, Trib. de
Com. de Marseille (requisitioned ship, action against the state), June 29,
1915, R. I. D. M. XXX, 367.
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the postmaster and other respol.Jsible officials, and while the Lords
Commissioners of the Admiralty cannot be called upon by the owners of merchants to answer in a suit for damages they usually
instruct their solicitor to defend. 21 While the same rule of immunity
from arrest avails in respect of vessels employed mainly or wholly
for public purposes, such as vessels of war, in the case of a requisitioned ship where the possession of the government was merely
temporary the warrant was set aside but it was stated that an
action could be brought against the owners. In other_ words, a
writ could be issued.22 Thus it is apparent that while the ship of a
sovereign power is not under the British law liable in an action in
rem, and all proceedings can be set aside,2 3 the British admiralty
court is not incompetent to give relief. It will indeed take jurisdiction so far as to arbitrate where the foreign sovereign consents.
It seems obvious that it is judgment in rem, good against all the
world under both American and British systems, which the British
courts decline to pronounce for the reason that it would be incompatible with the position and dignity of the foreign sovereign to
enforce such a judgment against his property.
·
In determining the public status of a vessel which will draw to
itself the immunity accorded the property of a sovereign, a little
considered but really very important element is the question of the
assumption of risk of sea-damage and other injury. Thus, a vessel
under charter to the Crown and used as a transport, but not demised,
all risk of sea-damage being at the risk of the owners, was held not
to be a ship of the Crown.24 More recently, requisition by the Admiralty of a tug whose owners incurred the marine risks was held not
to preclude their claim for salvage which would have been denied
had the Crown been the owner. Under the uniform type of charter
party adopted in France relative to the general requisition of its
shipping, the French government assumed all risks, an act consistent
with the necessities of the war, but in no way ousting the jurisdic- _
tion of the administrative tribunals. In other words, the assumption of risk, be it war or marine, bears an important relation to the
See Roscoe, Admiralty Practice, 4th ed., pp. 97 et seq.
The Broadmayne, [1916] P. 64
2 3 The Parlement Belge, L. R. 5 P. D. 197 (188o).
24 The Nile, L. R. 4 A. & E. 449 (1875).
21

22
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liability of the government which should not be overlooked in fixing responsibility and in determining competency.
In Long v. The Tanipico,2 5 the American rule as to the immunity
of property of the federal government from process was extended
in the federal courts to the property of foreign governments, though
the immunity granted by such foreign governments in their mvn
courts depends upon the public use to which the property is appropriated. Actual and not mere constructive possession of the United
States constitutes the basis of the immunity of its property from the
process of its courts. This idea is traceable to the decisions in The
Siren 26 and The Davis. 21 But the opinion in the latter case was
directly qualified, if not reversed, by the decision of the Supreme
Court in United Staites v. Lee,28 where it was said: "This examination of the cases in this court establishes clearly this result; that
the proposition that when an individual is sued in regard to property which he holds as officer or agent of the United States, his possession cannot be disturbed, when that fact is brought to the attention of the Court, has been overruled and denied in every case
where it was necessary to decide it." 29 The distinction here was
between a direct suit against the United States and a suit against
persons asserting to hold under authority of and as officers of the
United States. According to the decision in The Davis, "the property of the United States may be dealt with by subjecting it to a
·maritime lien where this can be done without making the United
States a party." In Workman v. New York City3° the Supreme
Court held that the immunity of the sovereign from suit in his own
court or of a foreign sovereign, by reason of international comity,
liability being admitted, rests alone on inability to give redress
where jurisdiction over the person or property cannot be exerted.
As interpreted recently by the Supreme Court of the United States,31
Workman v. New York City is declared to have "dealt with a question of the substantive law of Admiralty, not the power to exercise
76 Fed. Cas. 491.
Wall. 152.
27 IO Wall. 15.
2s lo6 U. S. 196.
29 106 U. S. lg6, 215-16.
2s

!!6 7

so 179
a1

u. s. 552.

No. 25, Original, Oct. Term, 1920.
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jurisdiction over the person of defendant," and it is said that "in
the opinion the Court was careful to distinguish between the
immunity from jurisdiction attributable to a sovereign upon
grounds of policy, and immunity from liability in a particular case."
"Sovereignty does not necessarily imply an exemption of its property from judicial process and jurisdiction of the courts of justice;
* * * it seems a fair inference from the duties of the sovereign in
such cases that where a lien exists on property upon general principles of justice jure gentium that lien ought to be presumed to be
admitted and protected by every sovereign until the presumption
is repelled by some positive edict to the contrary."32 Chief Justice
Marshall was of opinion that "when a government becomes a partner in any trading company it divests itself so far as it concerns
the transactions of that company of its sovereign character and
takes that of a private citizen."33
It is apparent that immunity of the property of a foreign sovereign from suit rests upon principles of international comity, though
the rule respecting the possession of the government which obtains
in cases where the United States is party defendant has been
extended to cases involving the vessels of a foreign sovereign. It
is believed that the judicial power of the federal courts in admiralty
to limit their jurisdiction because of international comity is always
constrained by their obligation to protect and enforce the constitutional rights of citizens of the United States, as well as those
entitled to the protection of the United States, including all such
vested rights of property as arise under the general maritime law
and constitute rights in rem or maritime liens. In the case of The
Pesaro,84 the Supreme Court of the United States has said: "By
the Judicial Code, sec. 24, cl. 3, the District courts are invested with
original jurisdiction of 'all civil causes of admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction' ; and this is a suit of that character. Whether Congress intended this statute should include sitits against ships such
as the Pesaro is represented to be in the Ambassador's suggestion,
when they are within the waters of the United States, is as y,et an
open question. The statute contains no express exception of them;
32
33
34

Story, J., in United States v. Wilder, 3 Sumner 307, 317.
Bank of the United States v. The Planters Bank, 9 Wheat. 904, 907.
255

u. s. 216.
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but it may be that they are impliedly excepted. The Exchange, 7
Cranch n6, 136, 146. If so, the implication is a part of the statute.
United States v. Babbit, l Black. 55, 6I ; South Carolina v. United
States, 199 U. S. 437, 45I." This was the case of a steamer owned
by the Government of Italy, libelled in rem for damage to cargo.
In its earlier decision in Re Muir,35 the Supreme Court admitted
that it would "be taking a long step" to apply the doctrine of The
Exchange to the question of immunity from arrest of the vessel in
that case, the vessel being under requisition to a foreign government. The nature and extent of governmental service and control
would, if inferences are to be drawn from this opinion, constitute
important elements in such decision and the conclusion would be
unavoidable that jurisdiction in both cases must tum upon the status
of the vessel as destined to commercial use rather than some agency
essentially governmental in purpose. In this latter decision the
Supreme Court held that it will regard the public law of the foreign
country in respect to the right of its accredited representative to
intervene in admiralty suits in the courts of the United States. It
would seem therefore that it should further give weight in its decision to the administrative law of such foreign country by virtue of
which suits concerning its vessels, whether of war or of commerce,
are submitted to administrative tribunals. Further, where the lien
asserted arises by reason of foreign contract or foreign delict, it
would seem that the lez locus enters fundamentally into the solution of this question of the immunity of requisitioned or government-owned merchant ships of a foreign sovereign.
The question whether by international law the rule of The
Exchange is to be applied to other kinds of public vessels owned
or controlled by friendly powers was not decided in The Queen
City,3 a but the Court there relied on the principle exempting the
property of municipal corporations employed for public and governmental purposes from seizure by admiralty process in rent, holding that it applied with even greater force to exempt public property of a state used and employed for public and governmental purposes. The decision turned on a rule, not of international law but
-0f municipal law, that the machinery of government must be held
U. S. 522.
No. 26, Original, Oct. Term,

36 254
36

1920.
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exempt from seizure and sale under process against a municipality
or state. The question whether a suit in admiralty brought by private parties through a process in rem against property of a state is
not in effect a suit against the state remains open. The Supreme
Court had earlier declared the immunity of a state from suit in
personam in admiralty, brought by a private person without its
consent, to be clear; that in a suit against a state by individuals,
whether its own citizens or not, the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction is not excepted from the operation of the rule that a state
may not be sued without its consent. In the case of In re Hussein
Lutfi Bey, Master of the Gul Djemal,31 the question whether the
ship of a foreign government used and operated as a merchant ves·
sel is, when within the waters of the United States, immune from
process in rem was thought debatable. The Court significantly commented~ "It is not plain that there is an absence of jurisdiction."
The Act of Congress of March 9, 1920, authorizing actions in
personam against the United States in admiralty suits for salvage
services, in the light of the foregoing recent decisions, fails to
observe the distinction toward which the Supreme Court very obviously inclines. The statute grants a right in personam in the federal court, with the proviso that in view thereof the vessel shall not
be subject to arrest or seizure by judicial process of the United
States. Should the Supreme Court hold ultimately -that the prop··
erty or vessels of a state engaged in commerce are subject to maritime liens and may be proceeded against in rem, it is apparent that
the Act of Congress must fall in this particular, since it would
operate to alter the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. In providing for the release upon stipulation of cargoes or vessels from
arrest and attachment in foreign ports, in the same Act, Congress
has tacitly admitted a possible jurisdictional power which appears
to go farther than continental decisions indicate and include saisie
arret of vessels owned, in the possession of, or operated by the
United States. This provision includes a reservation that no claim
to immunity of such vessel or cargo from foreign arrest shall be foreclosed or otherwise prejudiced in a proper case. But it follows that
a like exemption should arise upon principles of comity in favor of
foreign government-owned vessels under libel in the United States;
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and it thus becomes essential to detennine, whether the indicated
attitude qf the Supreme Court, should it crystallize in decision
affirming the jurisdiction of the federal courts to entertain suits in.
rem against the property of the United States or of foreign sovereigns, will not make such reservation quite inoperative. The test
in all these cases, whether the vessel be under requisition or otherwise in the ownership or possession and operation of government,
is the use of the ship or the destination of the property to commercial uses rather than the ends of state. That this distinction presents difficulty in itself is patent. How \Vlll one differentiate strictly
when the revenues of the state and so the agencies of government
may be vitally affected by the profits from the government's commercial enterprises?
New York Cit'j•.
· J. WHITLA STINSON.

